The question 'why are we in Afghanistan' should really be 'why should we still be there with ground forces'? Is there even a good argument for continuing that presence? If not, we should get out in an orderly way which minimizes harm to the Afghans and ourselves. If so, the question is 'to what extent' and with what force', a question with which I am not concerned here because I do not have the military expertise to discuss it and, anyway, it would require a detailed and extensive consideration of goals, timetables, etc. and this is an essay, not a five hundred page book. The practical question is how are our own national interests advanced by being there at all, if indeed they are?
It was by any measure necessary to send the military to Afghanistan in the first instance. The United States had been the victim of a murderous attack on September 11, 2001. Two New York skyscrapers were bombed and destroyed, the Pentagon was damaged, a passenger jet full of people crashed in Pennsylvania and the White House and Capitol in Washington were threatened. If there ever was an act of war this was it. It eclipsed Pearl Harbor. But with Pearl Harbor we knew what nation had attacked us, the Empire of Japan. Here the enemy was an insidious extremist organization named al Quaeda, not a nation state. However, as President Bush said, and almost everyone agreed at the time, if any nation was aiding, abetting and sheltering the guilty parties and refusing to turn them over to us that country would be held responsible for the attack and would be at war with the United States. There was such a nation, Afghanistan, ruled by another terrorist group called the Taliban, which was closely allied with al Quaeda and was acting as its protector. We had to react with decisive military force and we did. Democrats and Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives all agreed on that.
The Taliban was deposed, thrown out, and our forces occupied Kabul, the capital. Immediately women were liberated after having been reduced by the Taliban to the status of slaves. Other benign and civilized reforms were instituted. There was one major problem, however. The Talliban remained alive and well in the mountains of Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, simply waiting to come back in after we had left and, for that matter, while we were still there. Most of Afghanistan was still either a target for the Taliban or was ruled by a confusing conglomeration of warring tribes. We set about trying to create a nation where there never had been one, a nation strong enough to fend off the Taliban and control warring tribes. Were we successful in doing that? Well, we're still trying, and it apprears that we have made some progress. Should we stay until the process has been completed or until we conclude that it never will be? Our original goal having been to bust up al Quaeda and kick it and the Taliban out, which was accomplished in large part, what is left which requires our continued presence at great cost and at a time of serious domestic economic difficulties in the United States? We should face two salient facts: (1) The fighting in Afghanistan cannot end with a peace treaty or a national surrender as did Word War ll.and (2) It could therefore go on indefinitely, though possibly at a reduced level of combat, unless the enemy is crushed completely.
So it comes to this. Is there now a compelling reason to remain in Afghanistan? It isn't nation-building. The Afghans themselves must do that if that's what they want. When we invaded Afhanistan we did assume some responsibility for its people, just as we once did for Germany and Japan. We have helped the Afghans and we can perhaps continue to help them up to a point but we cannot stay there forever waiting for them to resolve their internal and external squabbles and difficulties. Indefinite nation-building is not, I submit, a good reason for remaining in Afghanistan. However, there is a good reason to remain there at some level of force. It is that by remaining in a strategic location in the Middle East with air and ground fighting forces we are in a position to check, and go on checking, the progress of jihadist extremism. If you want a WW ll analogy, the fact that we stayed in Europte gave us a barrier to Soviet expansion, just as our armed opposition to Hitler prevented him or his friends from bringing his insanity eventually to the United States. Afghanistan is strategically located. If it ever becomes necessary to defend Israel, which is hardly a remote possibility, we have a distinct advantage by having a presence there, and in Iraq. Once we leave altogether, we're gone. And remaining doesn't have to mean maintaining a presence at the current level. It can be reduced to suit the circumstances.
I submit that it would be less than responsible for the United States to withdraw all military forces from Afghanistan and Iraq, including naval and air forces in that region of the world. It would simply be an abdication of our position in the Middle East and we cannot afford that in a region of such conspicuous importance to the world and such great danger of drawing the world into ever greater dangers and complications. I agree with Leon Panetta who recently said; ". . . the mission [in Afghanistan] is to safeguard our country by insuring that the Taliban and al-Qaida never again find a safe haven in Afghanistan". We need not confine this principle strictly to Afghanistan. Any region as dangerous and sensitive as the Middle East requires constant attention for our own security. If and when we become energy independant, which we are perfectly capable of doing if politics can be swept aside, the need for vigilance in the Middle East may be reduced. But we are now faced with the world as it is. The whole region --- Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia --- is simply far too dangerous not to have a strong military presence there.
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